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It has been said that each of the Thirteen Colonies, prior to the 
American Revolution, had stronger ties with the British motherland than 
with any of the other twelve.  The notion would seem to suggest, for 
Canadian purposes, that geographic proximity is an insufficient condition 
for meaningful unity; and that strategy may well overcome geography to 
create unlikely unity.  Of course, the more complex the unity at stake, the 
greater the import of the strategy—which is where the Brits got it wrong, 
and where Canadian leaders, from Macdonald to Harper, have had to get it 
very right.  
One of the cardinal tautologies of this early new, globalized 
century is that the Canadian state, much like its constituent provinces and 
territories, has become very complex indeed.  This complexity means that 
there is nary a policy issue that fails to straddle the discrete constitutional 
responsibilities assigned to the federal and provincial governments—
mainly as described in sections 91 and 92 of the Constitution Act, 1867.  
National security, health care, the environment, economic productivity, 
strategic infrastructure, Aboriginal questions, immigration, even foreign 
policy and international commerce—all have very tangible and material 
federal and provincial components.  (Multilateral constitutional reform, 
evidently, is  another such policy domain—one that may again before long 
acquire a certain political currency.)    
Enter strategy:  Shadowing this increase in the complexity of the 
federation, over the last twenty years, has been a paradoxical and marked 
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diminution in the number of formal policy meetings—so-called first 
ministers’ meetings or conferences—between the Prime Minister and all 
of the provincial premiers.  The genesis of this diminution can likely be 
traced back to the failed constitutional negotiations at Meech Lake and 
Charlottetown (the latter indeed attempting to constitutionalize regular 
first ministers’ meetings).  Having said this, the conventional strategic 
wisdom that has seemed to sustain the paucity of such meetings consists in 
the presumption of sitting prime ministers that formal first ministers’ 
meetings can only issue in misery for the federal government.  Indeed, a 
prime minister is more likely to be inclined to deal with each of the 
premiers on a bilateral, informal or ad hoc basis, depending on the policy 
file in question—if only to avoid the traditional political and media build-
up and high expectations associated with formal first ministers’ meetings 
in Canada, or to simply avoid the media altogether.  He or she may also 
see the formal first ministers’ meeting as a public, largely contrarian 
forum for exorbitant, little reciprocated, and often highly elastic ‘asks’ by 
the provincial premiers—in other words, centrifugal stresses on both the 
federal purse and the integrity of federal constitutional powers.  Prime 
Minister Harper, for his part, might add the original nuance that, on his 
view, certain first ministers’ meetings can only tend toward unnecessary 
encroachments by one level of government on the constitutional 
competences of another.   
The result of this strategic logic, predictably, has been that Prime 
Minister Jean Chrétien had formal first ministers’ meetings very 
irregularly—indeed, less than one per year in power, and only one (on 
health care) in his final three years; Paul Martin had only one—also 
mainly on health care—in his two years in office; and Stephen Harper has 
to date also, after more than two and a half years in power, only had one, 
largely in camera, first ministers’ meeting.  (NAFTA, NATO and G-8 
summits have all been held with greater frequency; as have, on the 
provincial side, meetings of the Council of the Federation and those of 
regional provinces and American states.)  And there is no evidence that 
another first ministers’ meeting will be held before the next general federal 
election.  
One might suppose that such terribly infrequent gatherings of 
Prime Minister and premiers should pass with negligible consequence for 
the governance of Canada.  (For good measure, we might easily presume 




that representatives of First Nations and perhaps even municipal 
governments could well have a place at such a table—the said complexity 
oblige.)  Such a supposition, however, is belied by two critical realities:  
first, as mentioned, most of Canada’s key policy files straddle the federal-
provincial divide; and second, and most importantly, because of the mass 
and complexity of the government bureaucracies that run these files, 
meaningful forward movement on any file can only consist in a sustained, 
serious process that mobilizes the machineries of governments at both 
federal and provincial levels.  And the most muscular mobilization of 
government bureaucracies occurs strictly through stable executive interest, 
pressure and direction—in particular, direction from the head of 
government.   
Just as the federal executive—the Prime Minister, in particular—
greases the wheels of the federal bureaucracy, so too must there be 
sustained and reasonably concurrent political ‘oxygen’ from all of the 
country’s heads of government in order to advance interlocking or cross-
jurisdictional files of national import.  Absent such ‘oxygen’ across all 
governments, attempts to advance pan-Canadian policy files will amount 
to niche projects; in essence, mere pokes or small dents—themselves often 
incoherent or inconsistent across the governments—in the national policy 
infrastructure.  In the worst case, such initiatives, typically mooted by the 
federal government, will reduce to naught.  A media release will be issued 
about soi-disant intergovernmental cooperation.  Political and bureaucratic 
incentives to deliver meaningfully on the file will be small, and 
accountability for results paltry.  The media and general public, conflating 
intergovernmental calm (indeed, stasis) with a healthy federation, will fail 
to complain.  
So the dearth of first ministers’ meetings in Canada—the said 
conventional strategic wisdom—may well make for good politics, but it 
often makes for poor national policy.  The Prime Minister, and indeed 
some of the premiers, may be spared the notorious “trip to the dentist” of 
which Jacques Parizeau once contemptuously spoke.  Ten (or thirteen or 
more) men and women will not need to stare down the one, and the one 
will not need to rely on opportunistic coalitions to save face in front of a 
public that mercilessly awaits a ‘deal’.  Such good politics, however, fails 
to move the federation forward in concrete policy terms.  Major 
interlocking issues are dealt with, if at all, either strictly on an intra-
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jurisdictional basis or via sporadic agreements or arrangements between 
two or more provinces (such as through the Council of the Federation) or 
between the federal government and one or more provinces.  But no bona 
fide pan-federation planning and oversight mechanism exists—a strange 
state of affairs indeed.             
Granted, bureaucrats from all levels of government meet often, and 
standing fora for meetings among cabinet ministers of the various 
governments do exist.  Still, the deliverables issuing from such meetings 
and fora are more often than not transactional rather than transformative—
all in virtue of the brute fact that it is only the centre of government, led by 
the Prime Minister or the respective premiers, that can approve 
transformational change, and, even more saliently, drive such change over 
an adequate period of time. 
What’s to be done? 
The conventional strategic wisdom currently has it that the Prime 
Minister meets with the premiers on an as-needed basis, and preferably as 
seldom as politically necessary.  Product (outcomes) are privileged over 
process, and politics is privileged over policy.  And yet, paradoxically, for 
the very absence of serious, sustained intergovernmental process, product 
and policy have been poor; that is, not in keeping with the scale of the 
complexity at stake. 
The famous Martin first ministers’ meeting of 2004 on health care 
is paradigmatic in this regard.  A single meeting of first ministers was 
called to “fix health care for a generation”.  The bureaucracies of the 
federal and provincial governments—mostly at their very apexes—were 
collectively mobilized for a very brief moment in preparation for the 
meeting:  to lay the policy groundwork, as it were, for the final political 
deal.  The deal was made, for better or worse, and because there was no 
plan for a repeat of this elite political forum on health care (the deal, after 
all, was to be a generational fix), the participant bureaucracies were 
demobilized.  Whatever intergovernmental (bureaucratic and political) 
best practices—consultations, policy development, trust—were developed 
in the lead-up to the first ministers’ meeting were discarded, with little 
strategic consideration given to the great expense of reinventing the entire 
wheel whenever the next big meeting should be convened. 




Indeed, it is this very reinvention of the procedural wheel that 
makes the dominant strategic logic of first ministers’ meetings so difficult 
to justify in policy terms.  For the one-off dynamic (or one-off ‘game’, to 
use the economics parlance) only serves to exaggerate the stakes of each 
discrete meeting, lending each meeting to impossible asks by premiers (or 
even Prime Minister), outlandish political hyperbole (“fix for a 
generation”) and overly fastidious expectations by both media and public 
for a glamorous dénouement.  The deal that fails to materialize or measure 
up to these enormous expectations is invariably condemned.  The health of 
the federation—even national unity—is questioned. 
The alternative scenario is equally problematic.  An important one-
off deal materializes, and is in keeping, more or less, with the exigencies 
of most parties.  Everyone goes home happy, more or less.  But who 
ensures that the policy goals of the deal, nationally speaking, are advanced 
over time?  The federal spending power notwithstanding, in the context of 
a deal that is not to be revisited in the foreseeable future at a formal first 
ministers’ meeting, each government—federal and provincial—is left to 
its own devices to implement elements of the said deal as it sees fit, 
answering only to its particular electorate—however vaguely.  In extremis, 
a post-deal intergovernmental (bureaucratic) task force may continue to 
oversee the progress of the deal, but this task force, in the absence of a 
future audience with the Prime Minister and premiers, will have lost much 
of the political ‘oxygen’ or momentum (indeed, incentives) that existed in 
the lead-up to the deal-making first ministers’ meeting.  (Of course, let us 
not forget that, given the current scheduling of first ministers’ meeting, the 
important deal of which we speak will be rare indeed.)       
So the absence of a standing or permanent first ministers’ process 
means that there is patently no systematic framework for regular, 
substantive advancement of complex, pan-Canadian policy issues.  
Conventional wariness of process compromises—or indeed negates—
product.  And yet this wariness of process fails to appreciate the great 
potential policy virtues of a serious, stable first ministers’ structure. 
First and foremost, such a stable first ministers’ process would, 
like most stable processes, over time develop a forward agenda or work 
plan.  If Prime Minister and premiers meet twice or thrice a year on a 
standing basis (by formal intergovernmental agreement), the forward 
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agenda might credibly stretch one or two meetings into the future.  The 
one-off game of today’s first ministers’ meetings dies.  The political and 
bureaucratic planning horizons begin to stretch beyond the immediate.  
The paradigm shift begins to take shape.   
The agenda and forward agenda may, depending on the founding 
intergovernmental agreement, be set by the Prime Minister alone or the 
Prime Minister in consultation with the premiers.  Ab initio, as they do 
today, both the federal and provincial sides invariably come to the 
negotiating table with typical jurisdictional asks—centripetal for the 
federal side, centrifugal for the provincial sides.  But these conflicting 
polarities or positions may be softened and, over time, even fused through 
the development of agendas—current and forward—consisting of small, 
incremental deliverables for each first ministers’ meeting.  Avoiding, in 
the main, one-off ‘big ticket’ deliverables, it is these more modest policy 
increments that, over the course of several first ministers’ meetings, lead 
to important transformations in pan-Canadian policy.  The incrementalism 
lowers the political stakes and potential conflict at each individual 
meeting, all the while diminishing the cost of failure—that is, the cost of a 
‘no deal’ at a given meeting—and lending itself to a smoother, longer-
term stream of policy deliverables.  (Pace political theatre, from a strictly 
policy standpoint, a boring first ministers’ meeting in the context of a 
continuous stream of boring first ministers’ meetings, is good news.  A 
disappointed media quickly catches on.  Public expectations are 
recalibrated.)   
 Critically, where we today have ad hoc working groups mobilized 
in response to, or in the aftermath of, infrequent first ministers’ meetings, 
the very act of standing up a permanent first ministers’ process (an 
‘indefinite game’, as it were) necessarily leads to the development of 
serious supporting bureaucratic structures.  Multiple intergovernmental 
(bureaucratic) working groups and committees are mobilized, led or 
driven in most cases by central agencies under the imprimatur of the 
Clerks of the Privy Council and the provincial Executive Councils, given 
the sustained political interest of Prime Minister and premiers.  (Contrast 
this with the current intergovernmental culture in which the average Privy 
Council policy analyst, outside of the secondary Intergovernmental Affairs 
section of the shop, virtually never speaks to his or her analogues in the 
provinces.)  The minutiae of complex cross-jurisdictional issues are cycled 




through these intergovernmental working groups in order to develop the 
policy bulwark that supports the deliverables of each first ministers’ 
meeting.  The incremental character of these deliverables and the credible 
existence of a forward agenda in which there are subsequent incremental 
deliverables for which a given intergovernmental working group is 
responsible together result, in due time, in strong working relationships—
indeed, in trust.  As such intergovernmental, bureaucratic trust matures, 
and as the interacting bureaucracies, energized and protected by standing 
political interest (itself synergistically a function of the very existence of 
this important process), recognize the indivisibility of many of their most 
difficult policy files, all participating governments become, for all 
practical and intents and purposes, locked into the process.  A new federal-
provincial paradigm governs.  And with time, the incentives for defection 
from the process by any one player—even with changes in government—
become increasingly small. 
Where we today have little high-level follow-up on individual 
deliverables issuing from first ministers’ meetings, the combination of the 
forward agenda and the incremental deliverables would allow individual 
policy issues to regularly return to the negotiating table for further 
consideration by Prime Minister and premiers (and, as suggested, possibly 
First Nations and municipal representatives).  After having considered a 
given issue or deliverable at a given first ministers’ meeting, the Prime 
Minister and premiers would provide robust direction for a future stream 
of largely bureaucratic work on that same issue, as well as for its return for 
airing at a future first ministers’ meeting.  This to and fro or up-down-up-
down, political-bureaucratic feedback between fist ministers’ meeting and 
working groups may repeat itself several times—that is, over the course of 
several first ministers’ meetings.  And it is this expectation of return to this 
elite table that greases the wheels of the intergovernmental, bureaucratic 
working groups and committees.  Moreover, it is this same expectation of 
return that, far more meaningfully than the current regime of public 
reporting, lends itself to a serious form of political accountability for the 
various governments.  The head of government—Prime Minister or 
premier—is no longer simply answerable to the public (or to the public via 
Parliament or the provincial legislature), but to his political peers in the 
other governments.  The incentives or demands for performance are high.  
Slowly but surely, real progress is made on major pan-Canadian policy 
files—just as one should expect in this complex country of ours.     
